Quantitative risk assessment and risk-based decision making
OUTLINE

Background
Tools for risk-based decision making
Safety measures
Case studies
BACKGROUND

Traditional approach to tunnel safety – prescriptive approach

- Framework of **guidelines and regulations** for design, construction and operation of road tunnels
- **Focus on technical design specifications** to establish a certain level of standardization and guarantee an adequate performance of technical systems
  - The resulting **safety level might differ** from tunnel to tunnel
  - Does not take into account **effectiveness of safety measures** in a particular tunnel
  - Does not address the **residual risk**
Modern safety standards take into account the evaluation of effectiveness of safety measures

EC Directive 2004/54/EC

- Introduces risk assessment as practical tool for the evaluation of tunnel safety
- Includes a list of safety measures, thus defining a minimum safety level
- Introduces the principle of equivalence: alternative measures allowed if they provide the same or higher safety level
Basic principles of a risk-based approach

Prescriptive versus risk-based approach

“Prescriptive based approach and risk based approach have to be used as complementary elements of the safety assessment process.”

(Recommendation, PIARC Report “Current Practice for Risk Evaluation for Road tunnels”)

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TOOLS FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING
Types of risk assessment methodologies

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<th>Scenario based approach</th>
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<td>Select relevant scenarios</td>
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<td>Analyse development of scenarios</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic volume</td>
<td>Investigate effects and consequences of scenarios</td>
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<td>Portion of heavy vehicles</td>
<td>optimize design</td>
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<td>Logical tree</td>
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<td>Initial event accident scenarios</td>
<td>Expected risk value (fatalities/year)</td>
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- Investigation of the overall system in an integrated process
- Assessment of risk values for the whole system

- Analysis of relevant scenarios
- Obtaining information on frequency / consequences for each individual scenario

Input: Influencing factors
Tunnel length   Traffic volume   Portion of heavy vehicles

- Input:
- Modelling of Consequences
- Results
- Expected risk value (fatalities/year)
- Risk distribution (F-N-Curve)
- Model the consequences of scenarios
- Test scenarios
- Analyze the development of scenarios
- Investigate the consequences and effects of scenarios
- Optimize design

Modern risk assessment methodologies

- Event Tree Analysis
- Input: Influencing factors
- Modelling of Consequences
- Results
- Expected risk value (fatalities/year)
- Risk distribution (F-N-Curve)
- Logical tree initial event accident scenarios
- Results
- Expected risk value (fatalities/year)
- Risk distribution (F-N-Curve)
- Model the consequences of scenarios
- Test scenarios
- Analyze the development of scenarios
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- Optimize design

![Diagram](diagram.png)

eg. evacuation

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Risk assessment process

**Risk analysis**
- Start
- Definition of the system
- Hazard identification
  - Probability analysis
  - Consequence analysis
- Risk estimation
- Risk criteria
- Risk evaluation

**Risk evaluation**
- Risk criteria
- Risk evaluation
- Acceptable risk?
  - Yes
  - Stop
  - No
  - (additional) safety measures

**Risk reduction**
The assessed tunnel is compared to a “reference tunnel”

This “reference tunnel” defines the acceptable risk level (because it meets all prescriptive requirements, represents acceptable conditions etc.)

- In Europe: tunnel of same geometry and traffic fulfilling EC-Directive requirements

- Additional risk of the assessed tunnel to be compensated by alternative risk mitigation measures
TOOLS FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING

Typical application of quantitative risk assessment

- **To support decision making**
  - For design decisions in planning phase (tunnel structure & equipment)
  - For decisions on additional risk mitigation measures (in case of deviation from prescriptive requirements, to compensate specific characteristics etc.)
  - To decide on operational strategies for emergencies (operation of ventilation, traffic management etc.)
  - To decide on safety requirements for upgrading of existing tunnels

- **To demonstrate a sufficient level of safety**
  - In case of deviation from prescriptive requirements
  - Demonstrating compensation of specific characteristics by alternative measures
  - In construction phase of upgrading of existing tunnels

- **To select the best suitable combination of risk mitigation measures**
  - By combining results of risk assessment with cost-effectiveness analysis for safety measures
TOOLS FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING
Methodical approach – Austrian Tunnel Risk Model TuRisMo

Methodical components of TuRisMo (system-based risk model)

**Frequency analysis – Relevant parameters**
- Incident types
  - Traffic volume
- Incident rates
  - Traffic composition
- Ignition
  - Vehicle categories

**Consequence analysis – Relevant parameters**
- Tunnel system, technical systems, evacuation, vehicle categories

**Event tree**
- Initial event → incident scenarios

**Expected risk value**
- (fatalities/year)
- R
- Dangerous goods
- Fires
- Mechanical accidents

**RISK**
- Mechanical accidents (statistics)
- Fires (model results)
Frequency analysis – basic incident scenarios

- Breakdown or malfunction of a vehicle causing a fire
- Breakdown or malfunction of a vehicle causing a collision (with or without fire as a follow-up event)
- Single-vehicle collision (with or without fire as a follow-up event)
- Collision between vehicles driving in the same direction (with or without fire as a follow-up event)
- Head-on collision (with or without fire as a follow-up event)
TOOLS FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING
Methodical approach – Austrian Tunnel Risk Model TuRisMo

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Results

Expected risk value
(fatalities/year)

RISK
- dangerous goods
- fires
- mechanical accidents
TOOLS FOR RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING
Methodical approach – Austrian Tunnel Risk Model TuRisMo

Consequence analysis – workflow for individual fire scenarios

- **Linear fire model** defining fire growth up to maximum HRR
  (3 different model fires – 5 MW / 30 MW / 100 MW)

- **1D airflow simulation:**
  Longitudinal velocity; defines boundary conditions for 3D model

- **3D airflow simulation:**
  Temperature, Concentration of flue gases at walking level (1.6m)

- **Egress simulation:**
  Distances that can be walked

- **Exposure projection:**
  Fatality rate for assessed scenario
Consequence analysis – fire development and smoke propagation
Parameters covered by smoke propagation model

- Combined transient 1D/3D simulations

- Implementation
Consequence analysis – egress simulation
Processing of results of smoke propagation simulation

- **Output**: temperature, flue gas concentrations, extinction co-efficient at a height of 1.6m
- **Transferred** directly into egress model, influencing the movements of people during evacuation
- **Accumulation-based intoxication model** applied (Purser model): visibility influences walking speed, accumulated physiological effects may cause immobility
- Different types of occupants with different walking speeds are assessed, maximum distance is computed after which a certain type of occupant is incapacitated
Consequence analysis – exposure projection

- Zones with stopped vehicles are computed
- Distribution function of emergency exits is computed for every point of the domain
- Distribution density of emergency exits combined with distances that can be covered gives the “mortality rate” (people not able to reach a safe zone = emergency exit on their own are counted as “fatalities”)
- Mortality rate and people density give the fatality rate of one basic scenario
- This procedure is repeated for all basic scenarios investigated, covering different fire sizes, different fire locations and different traffic scenarios
Examples of tunnel features which can be assessed in the risk model

- **Tunnel geometry**
  - Unconventional or changing tunnel cross sections
  - Gradient with special characteristics
  - Varying emergency exit distances
  - Continuous emergency lane / distance of lay-byes

- **Tunnel safety systems**
  - Special characteristics of individual ventilation system (e.g. varying or insufficient capacity, leakages etc.)
  - Influence of ventilation control over time (e.g. different ventilation strategies)
  - Specific meteorological conditions (e.g. big pressure differences at portals)
Examples of tunnel features which can be assessed in the risk model

- **Tunnel safety systems**
  - Effects of fixed fire fighting systems (FFFS)
  - Influence of time delays of incident detection systems

- **Traffic and operation**
  - Specific traffic characteristics variation (specific traffic composition, over time, congestion)
  - Influence of vehicle movements and all measures influencing traffic movements
  - Speed regulation and speed control
  - Type / location of facilities for tunnel closure (e.g. barriers at tunnel entrance, traffic signals inside tunnel)
SAFETY MEASURES
Hierarchy of tunnel safety measures

PREVENTION  MITIGATION  SELF-RESCUE  EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Source: BASi
Holistic approach

- A safe tunnel environment requires a optimized and balanced interaction of all aspects influencing safety.
- Additional safety measures need to be integrated into this complex system – taking interaction effects into account.
SAFETY MEASURES

Practical example: Lay-Bye

(important) positive effects:
- Safe place for vehicles not able to continue
- Drivers can leave their car without being exposed to traffic
- Broken down vehicle does not impede traffic
- Risk of subsequent incident (collision) reduced

(unintended) negative effects:
- End wall could aggravate consequences of collision, if a vehicle crashes into it
- Hence additional mitigation measures required (e.g. crash cushion)

Necessity of **proper assessment of all positive and negative effects** of measure on safety within a specific tunnel, together with **other aspects** like operation or cost

Source: ASFINAG
SAFETY MEASURES
Assessment process for tunnel safety measures

1. **Specific safety problems** of an individual tunnel must be **defined**

2. **Suitable measures** need to be **found** which are able to mitigate or compensate the problems identified

3. For the tunnel in question it is necessary to analyze how the measure acts on the risk caused by the specific problems, including interaction effects
   - This step must be performed qualitatively, but quantification is highly beneficial
   - The quantification of the effects on a detailed level can be based on data (measurements, statistics), on theoretical considerations, on practical experience or on expert judgement
   - For more complex problems – like the response to a fire incident – the use of complex simulation tools like CFD smoke propagation simulation or egress simulation may be indispensable

4. After having assessed the effectiveness of a risk mitigation measure on a detailed level, **the effect of the measure on the overall safety level** of the tunnel is studied
CASE STUDY
Upgrading of existing tunnel - scope

- Tunnel 1.5 km long,
- Bidirectional traffic (13,000 veh/day; 5% HGV traffic)
- Longitudinal ventilation
- No emergency exits

- Tunnel does not fulfil minimum safety requirements
  emergency exits not feasible due to extreme topographical conditions

- Compensation by alternative measures required

Alternative measures investigated:

a) semi-transversal ventilation with smoke extraction
b) Alternative smoke management (zero-flow ventilation)
c) Implementation of FFFS
d) 24/7 fire brigade located close to tunnel portal
CASE STUDY
Upgrading of existing tunnel - results

Decision on alternative measures based on:
- Results of QRA
- Results of cost-effectiveness analysis of measures
- Qualitative Assessment of additional aspects (like compatibility with fire fighting activities)

Decision in favor of implementation of FFFS
CASE STUDY
Upgrading of existing tunnel - illustration

Measure: fire brigade located close to tunnel portal
Smoke propagation in time steps of 1 minute –
with / without intervention of fire brigade

180 seconds
Fire brigade starts fire fighting within 3-5 minutes
CASE STUDY
Commissioning of new tunnel – Waterview Tunnel (NZL)

4.5 km long motorway project, closing a relevant gap in Auckland’s trunk road network, linking SH20 to SH16
CASE STUDY
Commissioning of new tunnel – Waterview Tunnel (NZL)

4.5 km long motorway project, closing a relevant gap in Auckland’s trunk road network, linking SH20 to SH16.

Includes a 2.5 km long twin tube three lane motorway tunnel, high traffic load, high likelihood of congestion.
CASE STUDY
Commissioning of new tunnel – Waterview Tunnel (NZL) - scope

Basis:
- Earlier risk study in design phase, justifying and specifying safety-relevant tunnel configuration and equipment in detail
- resulting risk level was classified as being “ALARP” (as low as reasonably practicable – hence acceptable), based on a frequency of congestion less than 1%
- a higher level of congestion should be avoided by traffic management measures

Objectives:
- Analyze the influence of a level of congestion > 1% on the personal risk of tunnel users, applying a system-based quantitative risk model (Austrian tunnel Risk Model TuRisMo 2)
- as reference case, the risk level of the tunnel assuming a congestion level of 1% shall be taken – representing the situation which initially was assessed as “ALARP”
- evaluate the differences in risk comparing the situation with increasing level of congestion (up to 8%) to the reference case
- identify and assess additional risk mitigation measures – as far as required
Risk model includes 2 types of congestion:

- **Congestion as a consequence of a preceding incident** represents initial phase of a congestion period (when the queue is building up), a situation which may induce secondary collisions and fires.

- **Congestion due to traffic overload** represents a standing / slow moving queue caused by traffic bottlenecks inside or outside the tunnel; characterized by slow speed – collisions will most probably only cause material damage, but no casualties.

- Congestion caused by traffic bottlenecks is also characterized by a **sudden drop of driving speed at its beginning**

- Initial phase of such congestion **may induce secondary collisions** quite similar to the congestion scenario caused by preceding incidents.
CASE STUDY
Commissioning of new tunnel – Waterview Tunnel (NZL) - approach

Risk model includes **3 basic fire scenarios**, different in terms of vehicle constellation and airflow conditions

- **Primary fire scenario**: During normal traffic flow, a vehicle has a collision or a break-down and catches fire

- **Secondary fire scenario**: An incident causes a traffic jam. A vehicle hits the rear end of the queue and catches fire

- **Tertiary fire scenario**: A vehicle in a standing / slow moving queue catches fire
There is a significant increase in collision risk from “no congestion” to “regular congestion” 1% of the time due to secondary incidents in the initial phase of a congestion, caused by the sudden drop in velocity.

Increasing level of congestion reduces collision risk, because collisions in a slowly moving queue are extremely unlikely to cause casualties (drop in velocity happens just once at the beginning of congestion).

The fire risk is very low – which can be explained by the low likelihood of fire incidents in general, the limited consequences of fires due to the good egress conditions and the effects of FFFS. The differences in fire risk due to the influence of congestion are low as well.

The fire risk increases slightly with longer-lasting congested scenarios - influence is negligible in comparison to collision risk.

No further risk mitigation measures required to reach a safety level equal to or below the reference risk profile.

The collision risk dominates the overall risk and thus as well the differences in overall risk due to the influence of congestion.
The secondary fire risk shows a sharp increase between a situation without congestion in comparison to 1% regular congestion due to the increase in secondary collisions caused by the beginning of congestions.

The tertiary fire risk is increased steadily by an increasing level of congestion but even in the case with 8% congestion the share in total fire risk is lower than the share of the other fire scenarios.

The three fire scenarios show quite different characteristics:

- the primary fire scenario is characterized by a high frequency but low consequences
- the secondary and tertiary fire risk is related to incidents with very low frequency but high potential consequences

Risk related to primary fire scenarios (representing a traffic situation without congestion) represents appr. 50% of the overall fire risk.

Risk share of the primary fire scenarios is slightly reduced with an increasing level of congestion – for the same reasons as explained for the collision risk.

CASE STUDY
Commissioning of new tunnel – Waterview Tunnel (NZL) - results
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

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